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Media, poetics and the narrativization of war 
                      Subarno Chattarji, Department of English, University of Delhi.  
 
 
Mass media and television in particular have altered the ways in which we look at our 
world and the ways in which politics, wars, and history are projected and reconstructed. 
The media presents seemingly ‘objective’ narratives of war. ‘This is the way it is’ say the 
slightly breathless correspondents out in the field. The anchors at home intone and repeat 
the idea that these reporters are conveying the immediacy of war. ‘It’s a minute by minute 
existence’ says Nic Robertson, CNN correspondent in Kandahar. The warfront is brought 
home to millions of viewers snugly ensconced in the global village. From Vietnam to 
Afghanistan the media has grown in sophistication and influence. By ‘the media’, for the 
purposes of this paper, I refer primarily to CNN International beamed to India since their 
veracity and authority is greater than Doordarshan or STAR NEWS (two local channels 
available in India). I will concentrate on the language of war, as well as the ways in which 
the media determines the parameters of the debate regarding a given conflict. Since I am 
not a media specialist I will introduce a few poems on the Vietnam War, a war that I have 
studied in depth. I propose to begin, however, with a propaganda model developed by 
Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media. 
One of the dichotomies sustained during the cold war was that of the free and 
democratic West and the despotic and totalitarian communist bloc. One of the signs of that 
‘freedom’ was the mass media, the fact that editors and anchors could critique the 
government of the time. Dissent was permitted in the West unlike the plight of dissidents 
such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov. There are nuances within this 
monolithic position that I cannot examine in detail. I mention this because the Manichaen 
logic of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ helped to sustain both sides in the cold war. The media in the 
West, however, was and is neither totally ‘free’ nor ‘objective’. ‘The mass media serve’, in 




symbols to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to 
inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate 
them into the institutional structures of the larger society.’1 In other words, the media is a 
powerfully hegemonic entity that creates and reinforces desirable opinions and values. 
Herman and Chomsky analyze the ways in which news is filtered before it is presented. 
These filters include the ownership and profit orientation of TV channels, the reliance of 
media on information provided by the government, business, and ‘experts’ funded by state 
authorities, and ‘anticommunism’ as a national religion during the cold war (now it might 
be said to be antiterrorism). ‘These elements interact with and reinforce one another.’ The 
filters operate so effectively that well-intentioned media people actually believe they are 
providing objective and fair coverage. The model is not, of course, a sealed one and 
dissenting views are occasionally aired or printed. ‘Occasionally’ is the operative word 
here because dissent is very effectively marginalized in the mass media. In the CNN 
coverage of the Afghanistan War available in India, we saw or heard very little about the 
scale and extent of antiwar protests in the US and Europe, but speeches by George W. 
Bush or Tony Blair were given prime time coverage. 
Vietnam was America’s first television war bringing home a sense of the carnage to 
millions of American homes. The media has been blamed by Congress, some veterans, and 
other responsible people in power of actually losing the war for the US. The logic is that 
images of war turned people off and they didn’t want to see napalmed villages while eating 
their TV dinners. Hence they turned against the war and persuaded President Nixon to start 
the withdrawal of US troops. Even as astute a critic of war as Paul Fussell asserts that the 
media during the Vietnam conflict was a moral agent, as opposed to its role during the 
Second World War: 
[…] in unbombed America especially, the meaning of the war seemed inaccessible. As 
experience, thus, the suffering was wasted. The same tricks of publicity and advertising might 
have succeeded in sweetening the actualities of Vietnam if television and a vigorous uncensored 
moral journalism hadn’t been brought to bear.2 
This is further from the truth than it might seem. As Herman and Chomsky point 
out: ‘It is a highly significant fact that neither then [i.e. 1965 when US Marines landed in 
Danang in south Vietnam], nor before, was there any detectable questioning of the 




intervention. By that time of course, only questions of tactics and costs remained open, and 
further discussion in the mainstream media was largely limited to these narrow issues.’3 
Mainstream media seldom, if ever, questioned the basic tenets of the war, i.e. the US was 
in Vietnam to protect and foster democracy. Facts inconvenient to these tenets were 
ignored or suppressed. Jack Lawrence, correspondent for CBS, has pointed out in his 
memoir, The Cat from Hue, that there was a significant degree of self censorship in the 
mass media, and that some scenes of war were actually enacted before the camera for 
consumption at home. TIME-LIFE magazine did not publish Ron Ridenhour’s photographs 
of the My Lai massacre for more than a year after the event. Print media and TV created 
and echoed a language that dehumanized the enemy. The death of civilians was ‘collateral 
damage’, Free Fire Zones implied areas where any Vietnamese person could be killed 
irrespective of his/her political affiliation or status as civilian, and acronyms such as DMZ 
contributed to the process of dehumanization. In sharp contrast to the media, it is in poetry 
that we find a resistance to this debasing of language and humanity. 
At an obvious but important level Robert Bly’s long poem The Teeth Mother Naked 
at Last, published in 1970, deals with the issue of disinformation - and its conceptual 
matrix, rationalizing, justifying - in an idiom of force and insistence. The agenda is not one 
of unearthing ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ information, it is one of highlighting the proliferation of 
the war, and the polyphony of that spread. The poem counterpoints brutal destruction with 
clinical military jargon: 
 
This is what it’s like for a rich country to make war 
this is what it’s like to bomb huts (afterwards described as 
“structures”) 
this is what it’s like to kill marginal farmers (afterwards 
described as “Communists”).4 
 
The appropriation of language and its manipulation for projecting doctored 
versions of reality is obvious and sinister. ‘Huts’ become ‘structures’, and ‘farmers’ are 
demonized into ‘Communists’. It is a process of naming at which the political 
establishment was adept. The fact that some ‘farmers’ may have been ‘Communists’ is not 




Liberation Front (the Vietcong), or the north Vietnamese, with a long anti-imperialist 
history, the farmers can never actually have been ‘marginal’.5 ‘Marginal’ is itself a naive 
epithet employed from a metropolitan, abstract standpoint, and this is Bly’s position as 
well, especially in his more didactic outbursts. The naive generalizations are indicative of a 
lack of comprehension of the ‘other’, who is objectified and dehumanized by the 
politicians and the military. The military establishment in Vietnam generated its own argot 
(just as the soldier developed a very different slang to describe the war): MACV, I Corps, 
II Corps, DMZ, ‘body count’, pacification, Strategic Hamlet Program. These helped to 
create an easily definable and therefore confinable reality, and served to depersonalize and 
dehumanize the enemy. Bly highlights ‘the horrors of abstraction - [...] the cartographic 
work of reinscribing Vietnam as a military arena’.6 Once the process of reinscription, 
reinforced by the politicians, was entrenched, the war could safely be consigned to an 
event happening in a distant part of the world. While the distance was a literal fact, the war 
had everything to do with the way America perceived itself and its role in the world. A 
large majority accepted the basic myths justifying US involvement and the images of war 
beamed daily co-existed placidly with the American way of life. Bly does not wish this 
placid response to continue, and collapses the distance between the war ‘out there’ and the 
war ‘within’ America - its collective psyche and national ethos as manifested in Vietnam, 
the civil rights movement, and the general atmosphere of strife. Bly refuses to distance the 
war: 
 
If one of those children came toward me with both hands 
in the air, fire rising along both elbows, 
I would suddenly go back to my animal brain, 
I would drop on all fours screaming, 
my vocal chords would turn blue, so would yours, 
It would be two days before I could play with my 
own children again.    [Teeth Mother, 19] 
 
Regressing to the ‘animal brain’ is essential in Bly’s opinion to comprehend the 
problems represented by Vietnam. The poem is a psychological analysis of American 
history based on the myth of the Teeth Mother, which posits an opposition between the 




‘Hugh Selwyn Mauberly’, where the poet characterizes his own generation as being tainted 
by war and its lies: 
 
Died some, pro patria, 
  non ‘dulce’ non ‘et decor’... 
walked eye-deep in hell 
believing in old men’s lies, then unbelieving 
came home, home to a lie, 
home to many deceits, 
home to old lies and new infamy; 
usury age-old and age-thick 
and liars in public places.7 
 
The most direct echo occurs a little later in the poem: 
 
There died a myriad, 
And of the best, among them, 
For an old bitch gone in the teeth, 
For a botched civilization[.]   [‘Hugh Selwyn Mauberly’, 191] 
 
Pound’s evocation of a rottenness at the heart of civilization reinforces the idea of a 
terrible cyclicity, almost the inevitability of war fought in every generation for spurious 
ideals. In Bly’s vision of America, The Teeth Mother ‘suggest[s] the end of psychic life, 
the dismembering of the psyche’.8 It is this dismembering of a personal and collective 
psyche that he presents. Normal, personal relationships seem like a weird aberration, and 
the prospect of playing with one’s children is as incongruous as the nonchalance with 
which the two pilots seek to ‘take out as many structures as possible’. 
The Teeth Mother motif, in so far as Bly uses it to analyze American society, leads 
to further aesthetic insights regarding political poetry. He posits a core of impulses and 
ideas that must be tapped to rejuvenate the polity and poetry: 
 
It’s clear that many of the events that create our foreign relations and our domestic relations come 
from more or less hidden impulses in the American psyche. It’s also clear I think that some sort of 
husk has grown around that psyche, so that in the fifties we could not look into it or did not. The 
Negroes and the Vietnam War have worn the husk thin in a couple of places now. But if that is so, 




is inside him too, the writing of political poetry is like the writing of personal poetry, a sudden 
drive by the poet inward.9 
 
The darkness-at-the-heart-of-America kind of psycho-poetic analysis is valuable in 
its awareness of historical and collective memory, in its perceptions of the connections 
between the war and the civil rights movement, and the need for the poet to introspect and 
internalize the collective, psychic tremors surrounding him. The acknowledgement of the 
poet’s complicity - ‘since that psyche is inside him too’ - is essential and ironic, 
particularly for poets such as Bly, who often forget this and take on the stance of the 
neutral prophet. The formulation is thus suspect in its attempt to search for the essential 
causes or flaws that have led to Vietnam. Implicit in this statement is the idea that the poet 
has the answer/s to the dilemmas facing the country. Such an analysis is couched in 
absolute and prophetic terms, and substitutes one set of certainties (the rhetoric 
surrounding the war) with another (the evil at the heart of America), obliterating the 
complex histories of the past in the very process of recovery. 
In Bly’s poetics and representation of Vietnam there is a calculated attempt to 
establish the extent to which brutalization within American society is responsible for its 
actions in that country. He does not see the war as an aberration in America’s pristine 
history, but rather as an extension of earlier histories of conquest, and these histories 
constitute a collective repressed memory, the psyche that must be probed by the poet: 
 
I think the Vietnam war has something to do with the fact that we murdered the Indians. We’re the 
only modern nation that ever stole its land from another people. [...] What you do first when you 
commit a crime is you forget it and then you repeat it. So therefore in my opinion what we’re doing 
is repeating the crime with the Indians. The Vietnamese are our Indians.10 
 
The comfortable lobotomy of Vietnam from US historical memory, traditions, and 
values, practised not only by ordinary Americans and politicians, but by Hollywood over 
the past thirty years, is something that Bly will not perform. Passages in Teeth Mother refer 
to the connections between seemingly disparate imperial encounters: 
 
The ministers lie, the professors lie, the television lies, 




These lies mean that the country wants to die. 
Lie after lie starts out into the prairie grass, 
like enormous trains of Conestoga wagons.  [Teeth Mother, 10] 
 
There is a rhetorical assertiveness and shrillness in these lines that project the poet 
as truth teller. Concurrently, however, the awareness of a historical legacy and climate of 
‘lies’ enables Bly to interpret various connections in US history that are often suppressed. 
‘Watching Television’ is a vision of America as a society convulsed by violence: 
 
Sounds are heard too high for ears, 
From the body cells there is an answering bay; 
Soon the inner streets fill with a chorus of barks. 
 
We see the landing craft coming in, 
The black car sliding to a stop, 
The Puritan killer loosening his guns. 
 
Wild dogs tear off noses and eyes 
And run off with them down the street - 
The body tears off its own arms and throws them into the air. 
[...] 
The filaments of the soul slowly separate: 
The spirit breaks, a puff of dust floats up, 
Like a house in Nebraska that suddenly explodes.11   
 
As a phantasmagoric representation of and meditation on historic, psychic, and 
societal violence, this poem is unexceptionable. Themes adumbrated in The Teeth Mother 
recur here: the violence within the heart and mind of America, the combination of the 
crusader-killer (‘The Puritan killer loosening his guns’) and guilt-ridden reformer 
individual (‘The filaments of the soul slowly separate’). The fundamental contradiction 
between the millennial hopes and brutal actualities to fulfil that vision comes to a head in a 
society at war with itself. The individual seems to have lost control and violence takes on a 
life of its own: ‘The body tears off its own arms and throws them into the air.’ This 
dislocated violence mirrors the act of watching the Vietnam War on television which 
further alienated the war by never showing wounded or dead US soldiers, and where actual 
violence was almost never televised. Television allowed the viewer to spectate without 




Falkland/Malvinas Islands conflict Raymond Williams referred to this distancing, the 
‘latent culture of alienation, within which men and women are reduced to models, figures 
and the quick cry in the throat’.12 Williams’s statement on the Falklands War is applicable 
to Vietnam where no responsible citizen could totally dissociate her/himself from the war. 
The fact that a majority of citizens treated Vietnam as being ‘outside’ their domain and 
their lives was indicative of dislocated violence; treating the violence committed by their 
compatriots as if it was being done by anonymous ‘others’. These ‘others’ could be the 
politicians or the soldiers, but the fact that they constituted an integral part of the nation 
was often overlooked. While particular groups were held responsible for the war, national 
myths and ideologies were seldom questioned. The passivity that the great majority 
displayed during the war is the object of Bly’s criticism. Vietnam, as pointed out earlier, 
was the first war brought directly into the homes of every television owner in the US. 
Individual citizens watched American power destroy another nation and this is Bly’s 
central point: that by not protesting the war, they silently participated in the 
dismemberment of the nation’s spirit: ‘The spirit breaks, a puff of dust floats up’. There is 
a disturbing involution that occurs in the act of watching this war on television: a society 
watching itself destroy itself in its desire to fulfil noble ideals. It is a society inured to 
violence, unable or unwilling to acknowledge the depth of violence within the country that 
manifests itself in Vietnam. 
In his poem ‘The Language of the Tribe’, Howard Nemerov reproduces the 
discourse of official doublespeak to indicate the inadequacy of a representational mode that 
presumes a monopoly on ‘truth’: 
 
The Secretary spoke of the “facilities.”  
Under his bald dome the mouth opened and spoke. 
 
The raids, he said, were protection reaction responses 
Against the enemy’s anti-aircraft facilities. 
 
That were harassing our unarmed reconnaissance 
Surveillance over their facilities. 
 
But might the bombs have damaged other targets? 





Possibly, he said, the bombs might have 
Deprived the enemy’s facilities 
 
Of access to logistic and supply 
Facilities in close proximity 
 
To primary targets; by which he meant, I think: 
“The bastards kept the bullets near the guns.”13 
 
The poem is a striking example of what Hugh Kenner defines as the 
‘phosphorescent quotation’: ‘It was long supposed that a politician was best mocked by 
parody; by isolating traits and exaggerating them. But in the mid 1950s satirists discovered 
that to mock Dwight Eisenhower it was sufficient to quote him verbatim.’14 The formal 
tone of the poem is deliberately foregrounded so that it can be undercut by the intervention 
of an alternative ‘personal’ voice and idiom. There is no single referent for Vietnam, no 
precise definition that can locate, isolate, and categorize the war, and this poem highlights 
the hierarchy of discourse operative in representations of the war. The ‘centre’, the ‘truth’ 
is constituted and articulated by particular administrations, and policy and military 
planners. At a press conference, which is an arena for the dissemination of this ‘truth’, the 
poet is ‘marginal’ by virtue of expressing an alternative and less acceptable ‘truth’. 
However, the poetic statement is ‘central’ to any representation of the war (and this is even 
more apparent in poetry by veterans) since it locates Vietnam in a non-absolutist matrix. 
The centre-margin paradigm requires the poet to constantly negotiate the problematic and 
often invisible boundaries between authority and dissent, the absolute and the relativistic.  
The question of location (the poet and politician vis-à-vis the war) and proliferation 
of the war is a central concern in the poem ‘Continuous Performances’: ‘The war went on 
till everything was it’ [Sentences, 19]. The protean nature of Vietnam complicates the 
position of the anti-war protestor and poet. The anti-war poet can easily be assimilated into 
the larger framework of democratic pluralism (for instance, the way in which Ginsberg was 
perceived ‘as a figure of patience, charm, and conciliation’ even in the Sixties, and is now 
included in university syllabi in the US), and a polity that can absorb and tolerate protest 




actual debate, it involves the manufacture of consensus through the media and films, 
among other means: 
 
the growing war 
Already sponsoring movies about itself 
To let the children know what it was like.  [Sentences, 19] 
 
The influence of films harks back to the Second World War because it was the 
exploits of John Wayne and Audie Murphy that inspired many Americans to go to 
Vietnam.16 The process of selective remembrance and re-presentation is evident in films 
about the Vietnam War, and Nemerov is anxious about its effects on collective national 
memory. Hollywood is not the only agent participating in the rewriting of the war. The 
documentary Hearts and Minds analyses the immense power and resilience of mainstream 
nationalism. In the film, Lt. George Coker, a POW, lectures on patriotism and the 
American way of principled survival to schoolchildren and mothers. He is welcomed back 
as a national hero. The film analyzes how the POW myth helped to create an acceptable 
heroism, in a war devoid of heroes, within the military-nationalist framework. While 
Hearts and Minds critically analyzes some issues, another documentary titled Vietnam 
Memorial is essentially a healing, reconciliatory film. While there can be no objection to 
the desire for healing the wounds of the war, it becomes problematic when that healing is 
at the expense of historical accuracy and memory. In this film, Vietnam is included in the 
pantheon of glorious sacrifices and history is revised: ‘We didn’t lose the war. The 
politicians did’ says a veteran in the film. The veteran is rehabilitated as a hero and 
absolved of all responsibility of trying to understand the war and its causes; so is the 
nation. The statement quoted is part of the extremely select remembrance that the Vietnam 
Memorial as monument and document contributes to, and that Hollywood films advance. 
A continual reappraisal and redescription of given realities is necessary if the poet is to 
resist the sort of convenient simplifications available in mainstream culture. 
In dominant American political myths as well as in popular culture representation, 
particularly film (First Blood, Platoon, Forrest Gump), Vietnam has been rewritten as a 




and his sense of unease at the way the war was conducted, but he concludes his memoir 
with a reiteration of basic goals: 
Let me be simple and direct - I want to be clearly understood: the United States of America 
fought in Vietnam for eight years for what it believed to be good and honest reasons. By such 
action, administrations of both parties sought to protect our security, prevent the spread of 
totalitarian Communism, and promote individual freedom and political democracy.17 
George P. Schultz, Secretary of State in the Reagan administration, was equally 
forthright. In an address at the Department of State, on 25 April 1985, he said: 
We carry the banner of liberty, democracy, the dignity of the individual, tolerance, the rule of 
law. Throughout our history, including the period of Vietnam, we have been the champion of 
freedom, a haven of opportunity, and a beacon of hope to oppressed peoples everywhere.18 
In a post-Vietnam world these assertions are ironic, reflecting a lack of historical 
consciousness, and reinstating of dominant ‘establishment’ positions. The emphasis in the 
political and military sphere has been on learning the ‘lessons’ of Vietnam. These lessons 
relate specifically to two factors that have determined American involvement in 
subsequent conflicts. One, no US ground forces must be involved, or if they are it must be 
for the shortest possible duration. Two, the media must be more effectively managed so 
that even the occasional voices of dissent are suppressed. Media management during the 
Gulf War, the Kosovo conflict, and the war in Afghanistan in particular exemplify the 
lessons of Vietnam. Note that none of the moral, ethical, ideological, and political debates 
that raged during the 60s are mentioned amongst the lessons learned, for if they were it 
would amount to interrogating some of the basic tenets of US democracy, freedom, and its 
status as a global power. 
The Vietnam War was televised primarily for an American audience. It was the 
Gulf War that introduced war to a global television audience and made CNN and its 
reporter, Peter Arnett famous. Arnett’s line, ‘the skies are illuminated over Baghdad’, 
projected war as spectacle, the transformation of death and destruction into a laser show, 
computer game, or film. There was no mention on CNN (or any other news channel) of 
incinerated Iraqi soldiers who were retreating and bombed during the retreat. Photographs 
of the infamous ‘highway of death’ surfaced later in selected print media. The increasing 
technologization of war allows for pride in the mechanics of destruction, which obscures 




wiped out by news – not merely alienated, but abolished. All that remains of it are traces 
on a monitoring screen.’19 TV wars accompanied by military experts pontificating on the 
virtues of a Stealth Bomber or a cluster bomb, further anaestheticize the horror of war. 
There were only passing references to the thousands of Iraqi children who have died or are 
malnourished due to UN sanctions. This lack of coverage is because they constitute what 
Herman and Chomsky call ‘unworthy victims’, i.e. their deaths are not worth mentioning 
because they happen to belong to countries that are undemocratic and/or out of favour with 
the West. Herman and Chomsky’s model of ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy victims’ is useful in 
analyzing some aspects of the media narratives of the conflict in Afghanistan. 
The media coverage of the Afghanistan War was subtler in terms of presenting a 
seeming plurality of voices. For instance, there were reports on the humanitarian crisis and 
conditions in refugee camps (although not on the extent or their direct relation to the US 
bombing). What were excluded were the hundreds of dead civilians from this and other 
related conflicts. There were no televised candlelit vigils or services for the Palestinian 
dead, for example. The ‘worthy-unworthy victim’ dichotomy is neatly sustained even in 
the midst of media pluralities. 
My analysis of these narratives and representations will perforce be impressionistic 
and tentative since the crisis is still unfolding before us, despite the overt sense of closure 
provided by the recent elections in Afghanistan. Focus has shifted to Iraq and the 
seemingly endless insurrection there, and crises roll on rather than come to an abrupt end. 
Also at this point I want to make an obvious statement about the fact of the September 11 
attacks. Nothing can mitigate the evil of the premeditated actions or the loss of innocent 
lives and trauma of survivors on that day. It was an act of absolute terror and just as 
innocent Iraqi children or Afghans ought not to suffer for the sins of their leaders, so too 
American citizens cannot be held responsible for all acts of US foreign policy. There can 
be little doubt, as Robert Fisk, John Pilger, and Martin Amis, among others have pointed 
out, that US policy in Palestine, Iraq, and the Middle East has been reprehensible and 
overtly biased toward Israel. This policy might explain the hatred that sections of the 
Islamic world feel toward the US, but it does not justify acts of terror against civilians. A 
State Department official stated in an American studies conference I attended in 




between US policy vis-à-vis Palestine and September 11. My position is not so extreme or 
dehistoricized, but I do believe that in the process of presenting a critique of the media 
coverage of the conflict we need to keep in mind the utter desolation of the human tragedy 
visited on New York and Washington. 
The War on Terror is a war without frontiers although some obvious geographical 
entities are being pummelled daily. It is also against an elusive and media savvy enemy 
and that makes the coverage even more complex and contentious. From a cynical point of 
view September 11 presented an ideal media opportunity: 24-hour news channels 
competing for viewer attention couldn’t have asked for anything better. As Ben, a war 
photographer in Pat Barker’s novel Double Vision, puts it, 9/11 fulfilled in a horrible way 
our ‘appetite for spectacle’. In this context it is interesting to notice the ways in which 
CNN calibrated the coverage through dominant headlines, starting with ATTACK ON 
AMERICA, then WAR ON TERROR, and finally STRIKE AGAINST TERROR. The 
saturation coverage in the initial aftermath (without advertisements, which is 
unprecedented) presented a repeated juxtaposition of live and still pictures. The live 
pictures of the planes dashing into the twin towers were of course spectacular, but they 
were bolstered by stills during the breaks. Breaks are an integral part of news programmes 
because infotainment requires advertising revenue and also competes with increasingly 
short viewer attention spans. The stills, with appropriate background music, created an 
ambience of collective grief, outrage, consolidation, and resolve. The rubble of the twin 
towers, architectural absence as powerful presence of loss and devastation, were the focus 
during the first week. The stills also displayed a smiling Bush with Sikhs, and then turned 
to aircraft carriers and other signatures of war. Many experts on terrorism, international 
policy, counter-terrorism aired their views but there was a surprising homogeneity of these 
viewpoints. There has been little or no analysis of why the events of September 11 
happened, the emphasis is on the who (the FBI whodunit, punctuated by press briefings of 
a grim John Ashcroft the Attorney General, camouflaging a monumental intelligence 
failure) and the how. There were information capsules outlining the hierarchy of Al-Qaida 
(as if it were a modern day multinational), or profiles of Osama bin-Laden, Colin Powell, 
and other personalities involved in the conflict. This limited focus served to define the 




in terms of domestic policy the attacks on Sikhs and Muslims was mentioned, but not 
given too much coverage. President Bush visited a mosque, posed with Sikh community 
leaders, and then the problem dropped off the screens. CNN did not, for instance, mention 
the continuing harassment of Sikhs at airports or the fact that about 900 people of Arab and 
Asian origin have been under arrest since the attacks. Instead CNN echoed the political 
ideology of the multiculturalism of the US as an unproblematic entity which must not be 
questioned or analyzed. It seems to me too much of a coincidence that so many of the news 
anchors on CNN International (not on CNN USA) since September 11 were hyphenated 
Americans: Anand Naidoo, Monita Rajpal, Zain Verjee, and Shihab Ritansi, to name a 
few. If they can read news on CNN surely American freedom and democracy are alive and 
well. 
In terms of foreign policy coverage there was reflection of the newfound bonhomie 
with Pakistan and the demonization of the Taliban. There was, however, neither any sense 
of history or of irony in this presentation. For instance, the CIA role in the arming of the 
Taliban and the close symbiosis between the CIA and the Pakistani Inter Services 
Intelligence (ISI) was never mentioned. Inconvenient facts disappeared and the 
dehistoricizing of the past is a crucial mode of creating the television history of the future. 
Television histories can be vital: there is a ten-part PBS history of the Vietnam War and it 
has been extremely influential in recreating the story of Vietnam. 
The media projection of President Bush combined some of the domestic and 
international compulsions. He was projected as a consolidator of US resolve and identity, 
even in patently non-profound statements such as ‘I can hear you’ when he visited the 
Trade Center rubble for the first time. More importantly he was represented as the decisive 
leader of the ‘civilized world.’ Thus while President Bush and other western leaders 
reiterated that this was not a war against Islam, there were implicit dichotomies created and 
sustained between civilization and non-civilization, Christianity and Islam, ‘us’ and 
‘them’. The stereotypes remained: Islamic radicals (protestors in Peshawar, Quetta, and 
Karachi) got plenty of coverage, but there was barely any mention of liberal opinion in 
Pakistan or anywhere in the Muslim world, implying that perhaps there is no such thing as 
liberal Muslim opinion. It is through this kind of reportage that Muslims are homogenised 




Huntington’s thesis of a clash of civilizations. Sometimes the rhetoric was not so subtle. 
Ameena Saeed, in an article in The Times of India, quotes Bill O’Reilly of Fox Television, 
who first advocated the bombing of Afghanistan to rubble and then went on to target 
Libya’s Moammar Gaddafi. If Gaddafi does not relinquish power then ‘we bomb his oil 
facilities, all of them. And we mine the harbor in Tripoli… We also destroy all the airports 
in Libya. Let them eat sand.’20 This rhetoric is not very dissimilar from that of the overt 
terrorists. 
For a President who had never travelled beyond Mexico and whose administration 
prior to September 11 was characterized by brash unilateralism, building a coalition 
against terror has been difficult. The media helped by covering the convergence of world 
leaders at the White House in a show of civilized solidarity. That sense of solidarity further 
heightened the ‘us versus them’ syndrome. However, that solidarity occasionally collapsed 
as when Ariel Sharon compared the so-called appeasement of the Arabs with the 
appeasement of Hitler. That the closest ally of the US was saying out loud what many 
might think privately proved to be a diplomatic and political embarrassment. 
It is when embarrassing or inconvenient statements were made that media 
management was at its best. Another example was Bush’s ‘Wanted Dead or Alive’ 
pronouncement. The declaration harks back to the West and the myths of the American 
frontier when men were men and not overly troubled by questions of human rights and 
international law. While the statement made good copy it was diplomatically embarrassing 
and hence phased out quickly. Another inconvenient phrase altered in the course of the 
Afghanistan campaign was the change from ‘Infinite Justice’ to ‘Enduring Freedom’. The 
former was not inclusive enough and reflected more accurately the prejudices of US policy 
makers. The diplomatically acceptable face is that of Colin Powell, a former general, 
Vietnam veteran, chief of staff during the Gulf War, black, and good for media projection 
of the reasonableness of American policy. In both the print and television media there were 
hints of differences between the so-called Powell doctrine and Donald Rumsfeld, the cold 
war hawk from the Reagan administration. It is significant that Bush’s politically correct 
cabinet has quite a few figures from the cold war. Of course, there is no real dissent but the 




decisions are made after reasoned debate. That the parameters of the debate are strictly 
controlled is never mentioned. 
Press briefings are the second mode of dissemination of information and control 
and fit in directly with Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model whereby the press 
depends on the perpetrators of violence for facts about those actions. In the Afghanistan 
conflict Ari Fleischer was the point man of the government. The briefings were 
characterized by a sense of bonhomie (Ari seemed to know many journalists by name and 
they address him as Ari) and no uncomfortable questions were asked. If inconvenient 
questions were asked they were not answered. Howard Nemerov’s poem relating to 
Vietnam era briefings (popularly known as the Five O’clock Follies) is as relevant now as 
it was then. 
The third and most overt mode of management was the conference that media 
owners had with Condoleeza Rice who advised the American media to air ‘abridged’ 
versions of any future taped statements from Osama bin Laden. She also said that 
‘inflammatory’ language used by the Al Qaida must be removed.21 White House 
spokesman Ari Fleischer went further and warned that American media ‘need to watch 
what they say’.22 The symbiosis between government and media is a commonplace, but 
what was astonishing is the extent to which the media acceded to the request. Ameena 
Saeed quotes Rupert Murdoch, News Corp CEO who said, ‘We’ll do whatever is our 
patriotic duty.’23 CNN in an official statement declared ‘In deciding what to air, CNN will 
consider guidance from appropriate authorities.’24 CNN chief Walter Isaacson added, 
‘After hearing Dr Rice [Dr Rice was Provost of Stanford University prior to her 
appointment] we’re not going to step on the landmines she was talking about.’25 
These statements give the lie to the myth of press freedom, media objectivity, and 
liberal press bias. They are, in this instance, prompted by the threat of Al Jazeera. This is 
the first television conflict where the enemy is media savvy. The Vietnamese, for instance, 
did not have access to or use television to present their point of view. Al Jazeera disrupts 
the cosy solidarity of the US media and speaks to an audience that the US media ignores. 
Hence bin Laden’s use of the media was termed as ‘propaganda’ and squeezed out of 




media and are adept at using it in a way that previous enemies were not. The problem with 
Al Jazeera is that it speaks to a constituency that feels disenfranchised, has a tremendous 
sense of resentment towards the US, and therefore cannot be dismissed out of hand. The 
importance of Al Jazeera is evident in the statements made to control access to its footage 
and the paradoxical fact that Western leaders such as Tony Blair have appeared for 
interviews on the channel. There seems to be a sudden realization that the ‘other’ has 
grievances and a powerful voice to air them. 
The media narratives of this and earlier wars are presentations and perpetuations of 
western, particularly US, hegemony. Al Jazeera is only a blip on the horizon because it has 
little access to the US market. The solidarity displayed by media barons in the light of 
administrative advice and the Jazeera threat is perfectly natural within this hegemonic 
system. Mass media is a global syndicate and big business and therefore unlikely to 
seriously question the paymasters and power brokers of its time. For example, Rupert 
Murdoch owns television stations in, or beams news to every continent. He owns STAR 
NEWS, FOX NEWS, SKY NEWS and so on. It is hardly surprising that STAR NEWS (as 
well as print media in India) largely parrots US concerns and anxieties. Media 
ventriloquism is inevitable in a global system with common business interests and 
therefore common political agendas. These agendas and their narratives are not transparent 
but a careful analysis reveals certain biases and desires embedded in these highly 
influential texts and what is not reported is often as significant as what is. Enduring 
Freedom rolled on while we remained glued to our televisions. Before long we had, and 
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